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To address the problem of multiparty, multifonun lawsuits, 
the American Law Institute (AM) has proposed allowing the 
consolidation of all related actions in a single forum. State 
court actions could be removed for consolidation along with 
related federal actions. Since many of these state actions fall 
outside traditional diversity and federal question jurisdiction, 
the ALI has proposed that Congress could authorize their 
removal under "Congress's Article I interstate commerce 
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powers."' The ALI apparently relies on Supreme Court 
decisions stating that the commerce power extends to all 
activity, whether interstate or intrastate, "commerce" or not, 
which alone or in the aggregate substantially affects interstate 
c~mrnerce.~ Although the ALI does not expressly show how its 
proposal satisfies the substantial-effects ~ t a n d a r d , ~  it
apparently concludes that the aggregate of all intrastate 
litigation substantially affects interstate ~ommerce.~ 
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDA- 
TIONS AND ANALYSIS 8 5.01 cmt. d a t  235 (1994). 
2. The Court stated in United States v. Darby, 312 US. 100, 114 (1941), 
and repeated in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 US. 241, 258 (19641, 
that 
The 
[tlhe power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the 
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities 
intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the 
power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate 
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted 
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 
same idea has been differently expressed to the same effect: 
[Tlhe federal commerce power extends to intrastate activities only where 
those activities "so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the 
power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate 
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of 
the granted power to regulate interstate commerce." 
North American Co. v. SEC, 327 US. 686, 700 (1946) (quoting United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 US. 110, 119 (1942)). See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 125, 127-28 (1942) (upholding commerce power to regulate the quantity 
of wheat produced for home consumption because, "even if [the] activity be local 
and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, 
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce"; the fact that the effect of the farmer's activities "may be trivial by 
itself" is irrelevant where the effect "taken together with [the activities] of many 
others similarly situated, is far from trivial"). 
3. The ALI explains that removal is not exempted from the commerce power 
merely to protect "traditional state functions." See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra 
note 1, 8 5.01 cmt. d, reporter's note 14, a t  236-37. I t  also briefly analyzes the 
commerce power in other contexts. Id. 3 3.08 cmt. e a t  155-56; id. at  310-11, 312- 
13. 
4. This appears to be the rationale for the ALI's reasoning in the 
consolidation context as well. The ALI states that "[tlhe inability to transfer and 
consolidate all or a t  least most of the units of a complex litigation could result in 
judicial and societal diseconomies that cumulatively would affect interstate 
commerce detrimentally." Id. !j 3.08 cmt. e a t  155. The ALI also notes that "the 
underlying transactions are ones that clearly have an impact on interstate 
commerce." Id. For these reasons, the ALI concludes, "a federal statute expanding 
personal jurisdiction to allow for the consolidated adjudication of complex cases 
legitimately may be based on Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause." 
Id. 
AFTER UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ 
The decision in United States v. Lopez,' however, calls into 
question both the ALI's conclusion and the standard which it 
applies. The Court there apparently limited the expansive 
substantial-effects test to "economic" or "commercial" 
a~tivities.~ The Court deferred many difficult questions raised 
by the dissent, including the definition of "commercial 
activities," and left open a range of possible answers to these 
questions with varying implications for federal power over 
intrastate litigation. I outline these questions, identify their 
most likely answers, and conclude that the affecting-commerce 
branch of the commerce power would authorize removal of 
intrastate litigation only if a jurisdictional requirement were 
imposed and ~atisfied.~ 
11. THE ALI PROPOSAL AND INTRASTATE LITIGATION 
Over the past thirty years, our nation's courts have 
increasingly faced complex litigation-related lawsuits in- 
volving multiple parties in multiple  forum^.^ The ALI has 
characterized this phenomenon as wasteful of attorney and 
client resources, burdensome on courts, unjustly slow, 
duplicative, and otherwise u n j ~ s t . ~  Although Congress has 
dealt with some aspects of the complex litigation problem,1° i t  
has neither provided uniform rules of liability" nor 
authorized consolidation of all related lawsuits for more than 
pretrial purposes. l2 
Through its Complex Litigation project,13 the ALI ad- 
dresses the complex litigation problem by recommending pro- 
cedural improvements governing the handling of complex 
litigation14 rather than substantive rules governing such 
questions as liability and damages.15 Among other proposals, 
5. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (5-4 decision). 
6. See infra part 111. 
7. See infra part IV. 
8. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 1, a t  7, 12-13. 
9. Id. at  7, 16-18. 
10. Id. at  7-10 (discussing the creation and operation of the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation, which consolidates separate but related "civil actions for 
pretrial proceedings"); see id. at  9-12 (discussing the history of complex litigation). 
11. See id. at  305 (discussing the improbability that Congress will provide 
substantive rules). 
12. Id. at  9-10, 21-23. 
13. For an explanation of the Project's organization, see id. at  1. 
14. Id. at  305 (explaining choice of procedural rather than substantive 
proposals). 
15. Id. at  3-4 (proposing that substantive law is outside the Project's scope); 
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the ALI would authorize a Complex Litigation panel16 (Panel) 
to remove from state courts actions related to a federal action, 
and to consolidate the actions into a single federal1' or 
statel8 action. Under the proposed standards, the Panel would 
have power to remove "intrastate litigation," a term I use in 
this paper to refer to actions that are originally filed in a state 
court between citizens of the court's state, and in which state 
law alone provides the substantive law to be applied.lg So 
id. at  305 (discussing the improbability that Congress will provide substantive 
rules). 
16. The ALI proposal authorizes a Complex Litigation Panel (Panel) to 
consolidate all related federal actions into a single federal or state action. See id. 
5 3.02 (establishing and empowering the Panel); id. 5 3.01(a) (providing the 
standard for transfer and consolidation); id. 5 4.01(a) (authorizing consolidation in 
state courts). More precisely, actions may be "transferred and consolidated" (rather 
than merely "consolidatedn) only if filed in more than one United States District 
Court. Id. 5 3.01(a). Presumably, other law governs the consolidation of multiple 
actions filed in the same district court or in other federal trial and appellate 
courts. Id. But  see id. 5 3.01 cmt. a a t  39 (language not intended as limitation). 
The standard for transfer and consolidation is likewise not "all related actions" but 
whether the actions share a common question of fact and whether their transfer 
and consolidation "will promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions." 
Id. 5 3.01(a)(1)-(2). 
The proposal establishes choice of law rules to govern the action once 
consolidated in federal court. See id. $5 6.01-6.08. 
17. See id. 5 3.02 (establishing and empowering the Panel); id. 5 5.01(a) 
(providing the standard for removal and consolidation). This statement is somewhat 
simplified. The standard for removal and consolidation is again not whether the 
actions are "related," but whether they "arise from the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences." Id. The Panel is also directed 
to refer to the 5 3.01 standard, supra note 16, and to consider disruption of the 
"state court or regulatory proceedings," the "burden on the federal courts," and a 
list of other factors. Id. 5 5.01(a). 
18. Id. 4 5.01(a) ("If the standard is met, the Panel may order the cases 
removed, consolidated, and transferred pursuant to 5 3.04."); id. 5 4.01(a) (allowing 
transfer under 5 3.04 to be made to a state court). The combined effect of these 
provisions is to allow the Panel to remove actions from state courts and to transfer 
and consolidate them into a single action in that or another state. 
19. The standards for removal and consolidation are stated supra, note 17. 
No part of these standards suggests that an action should not be removed merely 
because it constitutes "intrastate litigation" in the sense that term is used in this 
paper. Some intrastate litigation may be exempt because removal and consolidation 
may not "promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions." Id. 
5 3.01(a)(2). Two factors relevant to this determination could weigh against removal 
of an action because state law alone would apply: "the existence and significance of 
local concerns" and "the subject matter of the dispute." Id. 5 3.01(b)(c) to (dl. Since, 
however, state law alone will apply in nearly all actions covered by the proposal, 
the applicability of state substantive law will presumptively seldom enter into the 
removal decision. Some intrastate litigation may likewise be exempt because 
removal would "unduly disrupt or impinge upon state court or regulatory 
proceedings," id. 5 5.01(a)(2), or because of "the presence of any special local 
AFTER UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ 
defined, intrastate litigation provides neither traditional 
diversity jurisdiction nor traditional federal question 
jurisdi~tion.~~ Removal must therefore be justified on other 
grounds. This paper discusses only the validity of the ALI's 
proposal that the removal power may be justified under the 
affecting-commerce branch of the commerce power.21 
For the first time in nearly sixty the Supreme 
community or state regulatory interests," id. $ 5.01(a)(e), or because removal would 
"result in a change in the applicable law that will cause undue unfairness to the 
parties," id. $ 5.01(a)(f). Still, these considerations will allow removal and 
consolidation of many intrastate cases. 
20. It is possible that the removal and consolidation laws themselves would 
create federal question jurisdiction. But see Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation 
of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J.L. & COM. 1, 
42-49 (1990) (concluding that there is no federal question when federal law 
provides no element of substantive law). In other areas, Congress has "adopted," 
with some modifications, state rules of decision as "federal law," thus creating 
federal question jurisdiction, but the ALI does not recommend that technique here. 
Cf. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128 (1956) 
(discussing-without analysis of whether the adoption of state law as the federal 
rule of decision creates federal question jurisdiction-the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
which follows this approach). However, the question whether the removal and 
consolidation law would create federal question jurisdiction is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
21. I limit the scope of my paper to intrastate litigation because removal and 
consolidation would likely be justifiable under relatively traditional analysis if the 
parties were diverse or if the issues involved a federal question. 
This paper does not address other questions raised by the removal of intrastate 
litigation, the resolution of which may render the argument in this paper moot. 
For example, it may be that federal laws authorizing removal and consolidation of 
intrastate litigation cannot create federal question jurisdiction even if Congress has 
power under the Commerce Clause to enact such laws. See supra note 20. 
Furthermore, supplemental jurisdiction or minimal diversity jurisdiction might offer 
independent authority to consolidate intrastate litigation in federal court, though 
not necessarily in state courts. Finally, principles of the commerce power other 
than the affecting-commerce cases may authorize removal and consolidation. See 
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (describing three categories of 
problems within the reach of the Commerce Clause). 
Despite these possible limitations on the affecting-commerce question, the 
validity of the ALI's proposal to remove intrastate litigation may ultimately depend 
on the affecting-cornmerce rationale, and the effectiveness of the ALI proposal may 
depend on the ability to consolidate intrastate litigation with other related actions. 
Further, many of the questions raised in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 
(1995), have implications for other branches of the commerce power. The question 
of congressional authority under the affecting-commerce rationale therefore deserves 
exploration. 
22. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 US. 238 (1936) (striking down a labor 
act applicable to miners). My research has revealed no case between Carter and 
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Court this term held that an exercise of federal power exceeded 
the scope of the Commerce Clause. The Court's decision in 
United States v. Lopezz3 calls into question the ALI's 
assumption that the commerce power could justify removal of 
intrastate litigation. In Lopez, the Court addressed the appeal 
of Mr. Lopez, who had been convicted of possessing a firearm 
within 1,000 feet of a school in violation of the federal Gun- 
Free School Zones Act of 1990.24 The Court analyzed the case 
under the affecting-commerce branch of the commerce power. 
In its discussion, the Court "start [ed] with first prin~iples,"~~ 
chiefly the concepts of limited federal power and limited 
commerce power inherent in the Constitution's enumeration of 
federal powers and of types of ~ommerce.'~ The Court quoted 
Gibbons v. Ogden'sZ7 definitions of "commerce," "regulate," and 
"among" to demonstrate "that limitations on the commerce 
power are inherent in the very language of the Commerce 
C l a u ~ e . " ~ ~  After reviewing the commerce cases through the 
modern era:' the Court emphasized that even its expansive 
modern-era precedents "confirm that [the commerce] power is 
subject to outer limits."30 
The Court quickly noted that the government's only viable 
argument was under the affecting-commerce branch of the 
commerce power.31 The Court clarified that activities 
regulated under this branch must "substantially affect," rather 
than merely "affect," interstate The Court then 
characterized its affecting-commerce cases as falling into two 
Lopez that has invalidated a federal statute as beyond the reach of the Commerce 
Clause. 
23. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (5-4 decision). 
24. Id. at 1626. 
25. Id. 
26. See id. (implication of limited powers from enumeration of powers); id. a t  
1627 (quoting Gibbons' analysis that the enumeration of types of commerce implies 
that  there are other types not enumerated and therefore not within Congress's 
power to regulate). 
27. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
28. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. a t  1626-27. 
29. Id. at 1627-28. 
30. Id. at 1628-29. 
31. Id. at 1629-30. The affecting-commerce branch is the third of "three broad 
categories of activities [within the] commerce power": (1) "use of the channels of 
interstate commerce"; (2) "the instrumentalities of . . . or persons or things in 
interstate commerce"; and (3) "activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce." Id. 
32. Id. at 1630. 
11031 AFTER UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ 1109 
subcategories. The first involves "[a] cts regulating intrastate 
economic activity [that] substantially affect[s] interstate 
~omrnerce."~~ Through such acts, Congress can regulate both 
the economic activity itself and "activities that arise out of or 
are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in 
the aggregate, substantially affects interstate 
The second subcategory of cases involves acts imposing a 
"jurisdictional element [to] ensure, through case-by-case 
inquiry, that the [conduct] in question affects interstate 
commerce."35 The Court noted that the Lopez statute did not 
fall within either of these ~ategories?~ and that Congress had 
made no findings on the effect on interstate commerce of gun 
possession near schools when it enacted the statute.37 
Since a gun possession regulation did not fit within either 
of its subcategories, the Court examined the government's 
arguments under the bare substantial-effects test: whether 
"Congress could rationally have concluded that [gun possession 
in a school zone] substantially affects interstate ~ommerce."~ 
The government argued under this test that gun possession in 
a school zone "may result in violent crime."39 Violent crime 
imposes substantial costs that affect insurance premiums 
throughout the nation and discourage interstate travel to 
unsafe areas.40 The government also argued that gun 
possession in a school zone "threaten[s] the learning 
environment."" A poor learning environment handicaps the 
educational process, "result[ing] in a less productive citizenry," 
which in turn "ha[s] an adverse effect on the Nation's economic 
well-being."42 
The Court found the implications of these arguments 
inconsistent with the concept of limited federal power. Under 
the government's approach, the Court could identify no activity 
beyond federal power, "even in areas such as criminal law 
enforcement or education where States historically have been 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 1630-31. 
35. Id. at 1631. 
36. Id. at 1630-31. 
37. Id. at 1631. 
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sovereign? Although admitting the breadth of language in 
its affecting-commerce cases,M the Court reasoned that an 
expansive application of that language would, contrary to the 
first principles it had earlier articulated, create "a general 
federal police power."45 
IV. ANALYSIS OF LOPEZ AND APPLICATION TO
INTRASTATE LITIGATION 
The prevailing opinion of the Court, however, does not tell 
the complete Lopez story. Although a majority of the Court 
joined the opinion,46 and all of the dissenters joined Justice 
Breyer's dissenting opinionp7 there were two ~oncurrences~~ 
and two additional  dissent^.'^ The six opinions raise a number 
of questions about the affecting-commerce branch of the 
commerce power,50 and those questions affect the validity of 
federal power over intrastate litigation. The sections that follow 
discuss these questions and the Court's response, attempt to 
identify the most likely answers within the range of answers 
possible after Lopez, and apply those answers to intrastate 
litigation. 
A. Constitutional Basis for a Commercial Limitation 
The dissent criticized the Court's emphasis on the commer- 
cial context of its prior commerce cases as, among other things, 
43. Id. 
44. See id. at  1630 (admitting inconsistency in characterizing the test as 
"affect" and "substantially affect"); id. at  1634 (admitting that "some of our prior 
cases have taken long steps down [the] road [of granting Congress a general police 
power]," and that "[tlhe broad language in these opinions has suggested the 
possibility of additional expansionn). 
45. Id. at  1632, 1633-34. 
46. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined the opinion by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at  1625. 
47. Id. at  1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg, JJ.). 
48. Id. at  1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joined by O'Connor, J.). 
49. Id. at  1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. (Souter, J., dissenting). 
50. Many of these questions also affect other branches of the commerce 
power. The Court's opinion afkned "first principles" and judicially enforceable 
limits on the commerce power before turning to the "three broad categories" of 
commerce power that it felt were "[c]onsistent with [the] structure" of its 
introductory analysis. Id. at  1626-29. Thus, the Court's introductory analysis, 
contested in dissent, carries implications for all three branches of the commerce 
power. 
AFTER UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ 
an improper resort to "formula[s]" and "nomen~lature."~~ Jus- 
tice Souter characterized as a "pitfallfl" the "gradation accord- 
ing to the commercial or noncommercial nature of the immedi- 
ate subject of the challenged regulation," and decried the "hope- 
less porosity of 'commercial' character as a ground of Commerce 
Clause distinction in America's highly connected economy."52 
Assuming the difficulty of identifying "commercial activity," it 
would be prudent to examine the Court's claim that it is a 
necessary di~t inct ion.~~ 
As the Court noted in Lopez, the Constitution's enumera- 
tion of powers implies that those powers are limited.54 As ap- 
plied to the Commerce Clause, this implication suggests that 
Congress's power is limited to "commerce," and, within the 
category of commerce, to that which can be considered to be 
"among the several Statesns5 The construction of "commerce" 
to encompass items not constituting commerce "would extend 
words beyond their natural and obvious import."56 Although 
the Court was careful always to refer to "interstate commerce" 
and not merely "commerce," the wellestablished aggregation 
principle effectively abandons the implication that there is 
commerce which is not among the several states. In an era 
which recognizes, in Justice Kennedy's words, that "any con- 
duct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate com- 
mercial origin or ~onsequence,"~~ a view of the commerce pow- 
er that allowed the aggregate effect of noncommercial activity 
to determine the scope of the commerce clause would also de- 
stroy the category of noncornmer~e.~~ 
If the term "commercial" has ambiguities, those are ambi- 
guities created by the Constitution's grant of power over "com- 
merce." Judicial review of commerce power by necessity re- 
51. Id. at  1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
52. Id. a t  1653-54 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
53. Id. at  1633. 
54. Id. at  1632. 
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 8, cl. 3; see also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 US. 183, 
196 (1968) ("'[Tlhe subject of federal power is still "commerce," and not all com- 
merce but commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.'") (quoting 
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 466 (1938)). 
56. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824). Although arguing 
against strict construction, Marshall explained that if by "strict construction" its 
proponents "contend[ed] only against that enlarged construction, which would ex- 
tend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the appli- 
cation of the term, but should not controvert the principle." Id. 
57. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at  1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
58. Id. at  1632-34. 
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quires an analysis of whether something is "commerce"--or at  
least "commercial"-at some level or another. If it is impossible 
to determine whether something is "commerce," then judicial 
review (under any standard) is impossible. If inquiry into com- 
mercial character is fruitless when looking at the activity regu- 
lated, i t  is also fruitless when determining whether a substan- 
tial (or significant) effect of the activity is on interstate com- 
merce. If "commerce" is meaningless on both ends, Congress 
has power to regulate all activities which have significant in- 
terstate effects. Or, as the Convention phrased it (before reject- 
ing it), Yo legislate in all cases to which the separate States 
are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States 
may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legisla- 
t i~n . "~ '  
A commercial limitation on the commerce power respects 
the traditional rule for resolving questions of constitutional 
power: 
If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be 
serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is 
a well settled rule, that the objects for which it was given, 
especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument 
itself, should have great influence in the construction." 
Since the Commerce Clause grants power over commerce, it is 
proper to restrict federal power to commerce or at least to ac- 
tivities closely related to commerce. 
In Lopez, the Court did not articulate a precise theory of 
the Commerce Clause that would respect both the constitution- 
al text and its modern cases. One theory consistent with the 
constitutional text, Lopez, Gibbons, and the modern commerce 
cases would be to define "commerce" to include all "economic" 
or "commercial activityH6' This approach accommodates the 
broad power to enact economic regulation upheld in modern 
commerce cases without admitting that power over commerce 
59. NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY 
JAMES MADISON 31 (Adrienne Kochs ed., 1988). 
60. Gibbons, 22 US .  at 188-89. 
61. Not all commerce is commercial in the economic sense, as the term also 
applies to navigation and interstate travel. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States, 379 US. 241 (1964); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US .  (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The 
affecting-commerce rationale has been principally applied to the economic meaning 
of the word. I assume for present purposes that these terms are capable of judicial 
application. 
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grants power over what is not commerce. It also would explain 
Lopez's limitation of commerce power to economic or commer- 
cial activities, since other activities are not commerce. 
Equating "commerce" with "commercial activity" could also 
be viewed as a modest extension of the definition adopted in 
Gibbons v. 0gded2: "commercial interc~urse."~~ Since inter- 
course implies the involvement of more than one person, some 
commercial activities do not qualify as commercial intercourse. 
The extension from "commercial intercourse'' to "commercial 
activities," however, is natural in light of modern decisions ex- 
tending the commerce power to the internal operations of a 
business. To conform to precedent, "commercial activity" would 
need to include activities such as manufa~tur ing~~ and 
labor65 which have in the past been excluded from the defini- 
tion of "commerce. 
B. Judicial Role in Enforcing the Commerce Power 
As the Supreme Court noted in Lopez, it has consistently 
recognized the existence, if not the nature, of limits on the 
62. 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Similarly, an extension of Marshall's defini- 
tion of "among the several States" explains the regulation in modern cases of in- 
trastate commerce. Justice Marshall defined "commerce . . . among the several 
States" to include all commercial intercourse that affects more states than one. Id. 
at  189-90, 194. Marshall's test includes commercial activities which are local, which 
affect interstate commerce indirectly, and even those which do not affect interstate 
commerce indirectly. The test is not the effect on commerce but the effect of the 
activity on more than one state. Modern decisions could be justified under this 
definition of "among the several States" merely by recognizing interstate effect in 
the aggregate. 
63. Id. a t  189-90. 
64. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 US. 1, 14-17 (1895) (excluding 
manufacturing from the definition of "commerce"). 
65. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272-77 (1918) (excluding labor and 
production from the definition of "commerce"). 
66. Another possibility would be to construe "commerce" to encompass the 
original understanding of commerce as well as its modern equivalents in a service- 
based or information-based economy. Justice Thomas' research, United States v. 
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1643 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), may provide a start- 
ing point. This view would provide both stability, through its use of a tixed hist.orG 
cal definition, and flexibility, through its recognition of modern equivalents. The 
modernera cases could be reconciled to this approach not by calling the activities 
involved "commerce" but by acknowledging power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to regulate commercial activities directed a t  commerce. Justice Marshall's 
dehition in Gibbons, however, is tied to the text and history of the Commerce 
Clause, and the acceptance of Marshall's definition throughout modern commerce 
jurisprudence probably forecloses alternative historical approaches such as the reli- 
ance on the Necessary and Proper Clause as suggested in this footnote. 
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commerce power.67 As stated in Maryland v. W i r t ~ , ~ ~  the 
"Court has always recognized that the power to regulate com- 
merce, though broad indeed, has limits.yy69 The Court contin- 
ued in that case by identifying itself as the body to maintain 
the distinction between those powers within and beyond the 
commerce power of Congress." Although the dissenters ob- 
jected to the Court's application of this principle to the facts of 
Lopez, they did not object to the principle in the abstract. 
The current reluctance to articulate limitations on the 
commerce power results in part from past failed efforts to find 
practical limitations. Gibbons v. 0gden7' defined the Com- 
merce Clause broadly, to include all commercial intercourse 
that affected more states than one.72 Later Courts, however, 
tried to find limits on the commerce power by drawing distinc- 
tions between "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate com- 
m e r ~ e . ~ ~  The current test of commerce power speaks of a "sub- 
stantial effect" on commerce.74 These distinctions can be 
drawn, but a commercial limitation is better founded in consti- 
tutional text than are these distinctions. Moreover, assuming 
that the Court can identify a workable definition of "commer- 
cial activities," even an ambiguous definition seems more work- 
able than a determination of directness or substantiality. 
67. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. a t  1628-29; e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities, but recogniz- 
ing the possibility of a "substantive restraint" on the commerce power in favor of 
the states); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by 
Garcia (exempting from the commerce power certain regulations of states as 
states); E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. a t  16-17 (attempting to require a "direct" effect 
on interstate commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90, 194 
(1824) (recognizing that the Commerce Clause applies to "commercial intercourse" 
but not to that which does not affect other states). 
68. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
69. Id. at 196. Indeed, the Court there recognized two limits: "'The subject of 
federal power is still "commerce," and not all commerce but commerce with foreign 
nations and among the several states.'" Id. (quoting Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. 
v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 466 (1938)). 
70. See id. ("The Court has ample power to prevent what the appellants pur- 
port to fear, 'the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign political entity.'"). 
This quote applies directly only to the protection of the states from the commerce 
power, but the context implies that the Court recognizes other limits to the com- 
merce power. 
71. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
72. Id. at 189-90, 194. 
73. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895). 
74. Eg., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). 
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A commercial requirement would also keep the Court from 
assessing "directness," "substantiality," or other tests which 
essentially challenge the policy judgment of Congress. Justice 
Marshall stated in Gibbons that "[tlhe wisdom and the discre- 
tion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influ- 
ence which their constituents possess at elections, are . . . the 
sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from 
its abuse."75 Consistent with this deference, a determination 
of whether regulated activity constitutes commercial activity 
does not interfere with Congress's constitutional authority to 
regulate commerce. Instead, the determination merely decides 
the existence of that authority. While the same could be said of 
the "direct" or the "substantial" tests, the determination of 
these questions is by nature more bound up in policy questions 
than is the determination of whether an activity is commercial 
in nature. 
Marshall's words are susceptible, however, of misinterpre- 
tation. For example, the Court currently requires Congress to 
have a rational basis for concluding that the activity conducted 
affects interstate commerce.76 This approach is proper when, 
as has been the case to date, the activity regulated comes with- 
in the proposed definition of commerce.77 Absent a commercial 
requirement, however, this approach would confuse deference 
to Congress's policy judgments with deference to Congress's 
judgments of constitutional authority. On the other hand, if the 
commerce power does not extend to noncommercial activities, a 
rational decision that those activities affect commerce would 
not grant constitutional authority over them. 
C. Definition of Tommercial Activities" 
The principal dissent argued that the Court's distinction 
between commercial and noncommercial activities7' created a 
"legal problemyy and was unhelpful in deciding Lopez7' As 
75. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at  197. 
76. E.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 
277 (1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258. 
77. See infra part 1V.C. 
78. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court actually used 
the phrase "economic activity," id. at 1630, to distinguish its modern commerce 
cases, and later responded to the dissent's criticism with the phrase "commercial 
activity," id. at 1633, without defining either term. Because I perceive no intended 
difference in the terms, I use the phrases interchangeably. 
79. Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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mentioned above, Justice Souter further decried the commer- 
cial-noncommercial dichotomy's "hopeless porosity . . . as a 
ground of Commerce Clause distinction in America's highly 
connected economy."80 
The dissents' criticisms at first seem well placed, since 
nearly all aspects of society can be approached in economic 
terms. In his Economic Analysis of Law," for example, Judge 
Posner defined the "domain of economics" to encompass all 
"rational choice in a world--our world-in which resources are 
limited in relation to human wants."" In this view, 
"~]ousework is an economic activity, even if the houseworker is 
a spouse who does not receive pecuniary ~ompensation."~~ Also 
within this definition is the "trading" of services in the tradi- 
tional family between husband and wife," the decision to ex- 
ercise more or less the decision to commit crime,86 
and government decisions regarding these and all other is- 
s u e ~ . ~ ?  Indeed, all human activity directed at  satisfying hu- 
man wants is "economic activity" in this view if it consumes 
even one limited resource, such as time? If the phrase "eco- 
nomic activity" were interpreted to encompass nearly all hu- 
man activity, it would indeed be "hopelessny] por[ous] as a 
ground of Commerce Clause distincti~n,"~~ and useless in 
identifying judicially enforceable "outer limits" to the commerce 
power.g0 
The Court's use of that term, however, reveals a more 
limited meaning and provides clues to establishing a workable 
approach to distinguishing between activities that are within 
and without the commerce power. First, the Court distin- 
guished Wickard as "involv[ing] economic activity in a way that 
the possession of a gun in a school zone does not."g1 This sug- 
gests that an activity's economic nature is to be determined by 
80. Id. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
81. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). 
82. Id. 8 1.1. 
83. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added). 
84. Id. 4 5.1. 
85. Id. § 6.1. 
86. Id. 0 7.2. 
87. Id. $4 5.1, 6.1, 7.2, 19.1-29.2. 
88. Id. 1.1, at 3-4 (outlining the essential theory); id. at 6-7 (time as a 
cost). 
89. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
90. Id. at 1628-29. 
91. Id. at 1630 (emphasis added). 
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drawing analogies to  decided cases, of which the Court viewed 
Wickard as "perhaps the most far rea~hing."~ Although the 
Court does not explain what part of Filburn's activity qualified 
it as "economic," it is interesting to note that the Lopez Court 
recites the following features of Wickard: (1) Mr. Filburn op- 
erated a farm; (2) he regularly sold a portion of his wheat; (3) 
he regularly used his wheat to feed poultry and livestock and 
to seed future crops; (4) the Agricultural Assessment Act of 
1938 "was designed to regulate the volume of wheat moving in 
interstate and foreign ~ornrnerce";~~ and (5) Wickard involved 
a challenge to the Act as applied.g4 
If Wickard represents the outer limit of commerce power, 
one would expect "commercial activity" to include the opera- 
tions of a business which regularly sells its products on the 
market or utilizes them for further production. In the Wickard 
decision itself, the Court points out that the Act applied only to 
wheat "that the farmer may harvest for sale or for his own 
farm needCg5 The Court's later discussion of maintaining 
price "by sustaining or increasing the demand" may properly be 
limited to situations like Filburn's, whose own farm demand 
was repeatedly stated to justify the Act.96 When the Court 
refers to "b]ome-grown wheat" as competing "with wheat in 
commerce," the context is wheat grown on farms, not in resi- 
dential gardens.g7 The Court in Wickard stated that it had "no 
doubt that Congress may properly have concluded that wheat 
consumed on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the 
scheme of regulation, would have a substantial effect in defeat- 
ing and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at  in- 
creased prices."98 The only plausible significance to the fact 
that the Act was challenged as applied would be to distinguish 
from Wickard a case in which a similar act were applied to a 
person not engaged in farming as a business. 
In contrast with the Agricultural Assessment Act, the Gun- 
Free School Zones Act of 1990 was found to be "a criminal 
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1628 ("[Tlhe Court upheld the application of [the Act as amend- 
ed]."). 
95. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119 (1942) (emphasis added). 
96. Id. at 127-28. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. (emphasis added). 
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any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might 
define those terms.7s9 As in Wickard, the regulated party in 
the Court's prior cases would in ordinary speech be described 
as operating a business and as offering products or services to 
third parties for gain.loO 
The second clue to the Court's use of the term "commercial 
activities" is its admission that, "depending on the level of 
generality, any activity can be seen as c~mmercial."'~' On 
this ground, the Court criticized the dissent's commercial char- 
acterization of education as "lack[ing] any real limits."'" The 
Court's use of the terms "economic activity" or "commercial ac- 
tivity" must thus be understood to exclude any approach such 
as Judge Posner's that would encompass nearly all human 
activity. Although the Court admitted that its approach "may 
in some cases result in legal uncertainty," it considered that 
uncertainty the price of maintaining "judicially enforceable 
outer limits" on the Constitution's enumerated powers.lo3 
Third, the Court characterizes the question of commerce 
power as "necessarily one of degree."lo4 The Court quotes for 
this proposition Justice Cardozo's concurring opinion in 
Schecter Poultry: 
There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinc- 
tion of what is national and what is local in the activities of 
commerce. Motion at the outer rim is communicated percepti- 
bly, though minutely, to recording instruments at the center. 
A society such as ours "is an elastic medium which transmits 
all tremors throughout its territory; the only question is of 
their size.*lo5 
The context of this quote suggests a concern somewhat differ- 
ent than Cardozo's. Cardozo wanted to preserve a line between 
interstate and intrastate commerce. Having abandoned that 
battlefield,lffi the Court now applies the same reasoning to 
99. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626, 1630-31 (footnote omitted). 
100. See id. at 1630 (describing these activities in economic terms). 




105. Id. at 1633-34 (quoting k L . k  Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. A.L.A. 
Schecter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617, 624 (2d Cir. 1935) (L. Hand, J., concurring))). 
106. Since the Court appears to accept aggregation in the economic sphere, id. 
at 1634 ("The possession of a gun in a local school is in no sense an economic 
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preserve a line between commercial and noncommercial activi- 
ties. Although Cardozo's comments thus apply only by analogy, 
the analogy suggests that activities can be more or less com- 
mercial, and the more commercial the activity, the more likely 
its regulation will be upheld. The Court, however, does not 
identify the characteristics that would distinguish the degree of 
comrnerciality of two allegedly commercial activities. 
One standard against which the Court could measure ac- 
tivities alleged to be commercial is a fixed historical definition. 
Federal regulation of activities sharing a number of similar 
characteristics with historic commerce would be permissible, 
while those with fewer or more remote similarities would be 
beyond federal power. Taking Justice Thomas's research as a 
starting point, historical commerce could be defined as "selling, 
buying, and bartering in merchandise, as well as transporting 
for these  purpose^.""^ While this definition would be fixed, it 
would only be the starting point. The Court would then ask 
whether the regulated activity shares strong enough similari- 
ties to historical commerce, a strong enough effect on that com- 
merce, or a sufficiently close tie to it. Although these are all 
questions of degree, there would at least be a standard against 
which to measure the degree. Further, the approach would 
allow Congress to regulate modern equivalents of historical 
commerce-trade in services or information, for example. 
Another possible approach would be to evaluate an 
activity's economic nature from a lay perspective, rather than 
an economist's-that is, to ask whether an ordinary person 
would describe the activity in economic terms. Those activities 
at  the center of criminal and family law would not usually be 
so described, although an economist may so view them. 
Under either the historical or lay standard, intrastate 
litigation is not likely to be classified as commercial activity, 
despite an economist's opinion. A lay person is likely to view a 
litigant's recourse to court as a remedy for a failed commercial 
transaction rather than as an independent commercial 
transaction. While the connection with the transaction out of 
which the litigation arose is obvious, resort to litigation is not 
activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of 
interstate commerce."), there appears to be little local economic activity beyond 
federal power. The Court refuses, however, to extend the aggregation argument to 
noneconomic activity. Id. 
107. See id. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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typically a commercial actor's business. Moreover, if Congress 
attempted to regulate intrastate litigation by regulating 
litigants' lawyers, the regulation would not be directed a t  the 
commercial nature of the transaction between lawyer and client 
but at  the client's choice of forum. Since, under this reasoning, 
Congress could regulate all aspects of state court advocacy, the 
Court is unlikely to uphold it. 
D. Approach to Precedent 
The Lopez Court's approach to precedent also drew fire 
from the dissent. In reviewing modern commerce decisions, the 
Court stressed the economic character of the regulated conduct, 
of the regulated parties, and of the legislation involved,lo8 
even though the decisions themselves had focused not on the 
commercial character of the regulated activities, but on their 
effect on interstate commerce.10g The Court did not advance 
an explicit theory for this approach to precedent. 
Yet federal courts are not required to adhere rigidly to 
precedent, and may for good reason overrule or distinguish 
prior cases.l1° Even in systems which give greater emphasis 
to precedent, prior rulings can, for good reason, be limited to 
the material facts in those cases despite an accepted under- 
standing that the case stood for a broader principle.'" The 
108. See id. a t  1630 (characterizing Hodel, Perez, McClung, Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, and even Wickard in terms of "intrastate economic activity"). 
109. In Justice Breyer's words, "Although the majority today attempts to cate- 
gorize Perez, McClung, and Wickard as  involving intrastate 'economic activity,' the 
Courts that decided each of those cases did not focus upon the economic nature of 
the activity regulated. Rather, they focused upon whether that activity affected 
interstate or foreign commerce." Id. a t  1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omit- 
ted). 
110. See 1B JAMES W. MOORE & J O  DESHA LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC- 
TICE 'fi 0.402[2], 1-38 to 1-40 (2d ed. 1995): 
I t  has been argued by some that the holding or ratio decidendi of a deci- 
sion goes no further than the law necessary to dispose of the precise facts 
presented, and all else is dictum. In a system in which it  is assumed 
that a court has no authority to overrule its decisions, this narrow view 
of holding has great utility. It  would be inflexible enough to make immu- 
table everything the court does, let alone everything it says. In the feder- 
al system, however, courts are not inexorably bound by their prior de- 
cisions and thus in cases in which the issue is presented on a different 
record, the court is free to recognize the factual distinction, in some re- 
spect, or reconsider the principle previously announced and overrule the 
prior decision. 
111. E.g., Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 
11031 AFTER UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ 1121 
Court has a duty to preserve the Constitution's framework of 
limited federal power, and this duty is good reason to limit its 
prior decisions to their commercial context. Justice Marshall 
recognized the limitation which facts properly exert on general 
language in prior decisions: 
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expres- 
sions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the 
case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond 
the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the 
judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is present- 
ed for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The 
question actually before the Court is investigated with care, 
and considered in its fiill extent. Other principles which may 
serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the 
case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is 
seldom completely inve~tigated."~ 
Justice Marshall's reasoning is especially persuasive in the 
context of commerce power. Certain "expressions" in Wickard, 
for example, can be read more broadly than is warranted by 
the context. As noted above, the Court there analyzed Mr. 
Filburn's operations extensively before stating that "even if 
YALE L. REV. 161, 181 (1930) (arguing, to show that his "material facts" approach 
to precedent does not give judges infinite freedom, that "[elf course a court can 
always avoid a precedent by finding that an additional fact is material, but if it 
does so without reason, the result leads to confusion in the law" (emphasis added)). 
Professor Goodhart's discussion is quite helpful because it contrasts his view with 
two competing views. One view regards the Court's statement of relevant law, 
while another regards the facts alone. See id. at  162 ("The reason which the judge 
gives for his decision is never the binding part of the precedent . . . ."); id. at  168 
(disputing the approach which looks a t  facts alone). Goodhart instead sees the 
precedential value of a case in the court's conclusion on the facts which it selects 
as material. Id. at 169 ("It is by his choice of the material facts that the judge 
creates law."). 
For a critique of trends toward stare dictis (accepting as law the court's state- 
ments rather than the decision on the facts) and arguing for a very limited view of 
precedent, see Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 159 
(1928). For an extended exchange over Goodhart's and competing approaches, see 
J.L. Montrose, Ratio Decidendi and the House of Lords, 20 MOD. L. REV. 124 
(1957) (criticizing the Goodhart approach as inconsistent with the "classical" ap- 
proach to precedent); A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. 
REV. 413 (1957) (arguing that Goodhart's approach collapses into the classical ap- 
proach); J.L. Montrose, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 587 (1957) 
(responding); AL. Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REV. 117 
(1959) (responding); Julius Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi 22 MOD. L. 
REV. 597 (1959) (illustrating that the significance of a fact can vary depending on 
the degree of generality with which it is viewed). 
112. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821). 
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appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded 
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached if it 
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate corn- 
mer~e.'"'~ This language is expressly limited to Mr. Filburn's 
activities, and would apply by analogy only to similar activi- 
ties-not to all activities. The Court may have in fact thought 
that noncommercial activities, however remote in nature from 
commerce, should nevertheless be within the commerce power, 
just as Justice Marshall likely thought that his previous "gen- 
eral expressions" were correct.114 Neither question, however, 
was before the court deciding those cases. 
From this contextual perspective, the modern commerce 
cases are consistent with a commercial limitation, and indeed 
with Gibbons's definition of commerce as "commercial inter- 
course."115 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'16 and 
United States v. Darby,'17 for example, the activities regu- 
lated were labor practi~es''~ and the establishment of hours 
and wages for  employee^."^ These activities constituted "com- 
mercial intercourse," that is, the trading of s e ~ c e s  for pay, 
and Congress's determination that they affected more than one 
state was rationally based. Wickard v. F i l b ~ r n ' ~ ~  presents a 
more difficult case. The activity at  issue in that case, the pro- 
duction of wheat that never leaves the farm,l2' cannot easily 
be classified as commercial intercourse, since intercourse im- 
plies the involvement of more than one person. Mr. Filburn, 
though, regularly sold the wheat he produced and the animals 
he fed with the wheat.'22 Even if the activity did not consti- 
tute commerce, it was clearly directed at  ~0mmerce.l~~ The 
activity likewise affected more states than one, at least when 
113. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (emphasis added). 
114. See Cohens, 19 US. at 400-01 (Justice Marshall discussing his prior con- 
struction of federal jurisdiction and rejecting the application of very explicit reason- 
ing to the very facts which he had previously hypothesized). 
115. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824). 
116. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
117. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
118. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 22. 
119. Darby, 312 U.S. at 108-10. 
120. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
121. Id. at 114-15. 
122. Id. at 114. 
123. See id. at 127-28. 
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the production was considered "together with that of many 
others similarly situated."12' 
Similarly, Perez v. United States'25 involved commercial 
activity. Perez concerned Congress's prohibition of loan- 
sharking as part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act?" 
The extension of credit is a rather obvious example of commer- 
cial intercourse, and its commercial nature is not diminished by 
the use of threats in the transaction. Congress's power to regu- 
late commerce was, in part a t  least, intended to prevent vio- 
lence between the states over commerce. The commerce power 
should not, therefore, be construed to prevent Congress from 
keeping commercial transactions peaceful.ln Furthermore, 
extortionate credit as a class affects more states than one.128 
The discrimination cases can likewise be justified under 
this approach. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, '" 
the activity regulated was the hotel's discriminatory service to 
its patrons, which involved commercial interaction between the 
hotel and its patrons. This interaction satisfied the definition of 
commerce and affected more states than one by discouraging 
interstate travel.'" Katzenbach v. McClung13' similarly in- 
volved commercial activity between a restaurant's owners and 
its  customer^,'^^ and discrimination in that activity affected 
the free flow of food in interstate cornrner~e.'~~ 
In summary, a proper construction of the Commerce 
Clause justifies the results of modern affecting-commerce deci- 
sions without relying on their nearly limitless language. The 
commercial limit on that power is implied in the text of the 
Commerce Clause and is consistent with the facts of modern 
affecting-commerce cases. These cases all involve commercial 
intercourse, or at  least commercial activity. 
124. Id. 
125. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
126. Id. at 146-47. 
127. See id. at 147 (stating that extortionate credit transactions were defined 
as those involving the use or threat of violence). 
128. Id. at 152. 
129. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
130. Id. at 253. 
131. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
132. Id. at 296. 
133. Id. at 303-04. 
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E. Regulation of Noncommercial Activity 
Identifying an activity as noncommercial, however, does 
not of necessity foreclose its regulation. 
I .  Noncommercial activities arising out of commercial 
transactions 
First, activities which "arise out of or are connected with a 
commercial tran~action"'~~ may be proper subjects of regula- 
tion. To qualifjr for this type of incidental regulation, the com- 
mercial transaction-and not the activities related to it-must 
produce the substantial effect on interstate commerce when 
viewed in the aggregate with like transactions. Further, the 
regulation must be essential to the effective regulation of "com- 
merce" or of "economic enterpri~e.""~ 
If all these elements must be satisfied to justify regulation 
of noncommercial activities, intrastate litigation is beyond 
federal commerce power. Although intrastate litigation will 
nearly always arise out of commercial transactions, and al- 
though those transactions in the aggregate substantially affect 
interstate commerce, the ALI's proposal does not come as "an 
essential part of a larger regulation of economic a~tivity." '~~ 
Indeed, the ALI consciously declined to regulate the substance 
of interstate commercial transactions, opting instead for a pro- 
cedural regulation of dispute res01ution.l~~ 
The absence of substantive rules also suggests the ALI's 
proposed removal power cannot be sustained as an exercise of 
Congress's commerce power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. The Supreme Court has stated that "[tlhe power of 
Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regu- 
lation of commerce among the states."'38 In so stating, the 
Court was not construing the Commerce Clause to mean more 
than it says, but was noting that Congress has power "[tlo 
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry 
into Exe~ution"'~~ the power "to regulate Commerce . . . 
134. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 3-4 (proposing substantive law 
is outside the Project's scope); id. at 305 (discussing the improbability that Con- 
gress will provide substantive rules). 
138. United States v. Darby, 312 US. 100, 118 (1941). 
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 18. 
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among the several  state^."'^^ The Court further stated that 
the commerce power "extends to those activities intrastate 
which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the pow- 
er of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropri- 
ate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of 
the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate com- 
mer~e . " '~~  Despite its breadth, however, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is also consistent with a commercial limitation 
on the commerce power. 
As stated in McCulloch v. Maryland,142 the Necessary 
and Proper Clause grants additional power to Congress. The 
power granted, however, is limited by the ends for which it is 
given.'" The relevant end to which the Necessary and Proper 
Clause may be invoked is to carry into execution Congress's 
power to regulate commerce among the several states? The 
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
141. Darby, 312 U.S. at  118. 
142. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
143. Id. at  420 ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to 
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter of the constitution, 
are constitutional."). 
144. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, CIS. 3, 18. Several ambiguities in McCulloch 
raise difficulties with a textual reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause. First, 
the power to regulate commerce may carry with it implied powers. Marshall's opin- 
ion in McCulloch does not clearly answer whether these implied powers are legiti- 
mate "ends" toward which the Necessary and Proper Clause may supply additional 
means, or whether the Necessary and Proper Clause defines the extent of implied 
powers. Marshall gives as an example the powers to carry the mail and punish 
related crimes as implied from the power "'to establish post offices and post roads." 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. a t  415. Since this statement is part of his discussion of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, which follows the discussion of implied powers, 
Marshall's use of the term "implied" here apparently refers to those powers implied 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, not to those which would be implied in 
its absence. 
Second, the power to regulate commerce necessarily implies some authority over 
the object of the grant: in this case, commerce. McCulloch does not answer wheth- 
er the proper end is the power granted or control of the object of the grant. 
Third, i t  is unclear whether McCulloch supports a textual link between the 
Necessary and Proper Clause and the power in whose aid i t  is invoked. Of special 
difficulty is Marshall's failure to show how the bank was a proper means of carry- 
ing into execution the power granted in the Commerce Clause. He cited the Com- 
merce Clause among other "great powers," but his analysis centered on the powers 
to collect and spend taxes and to support troops. 
Throughout this vast republic, . . . revenue is to be collected and expend- 
ed, armies are to be marched and supported. The exigencies of the nation 
may require that the treasure raised in the north should be transported 
to the south, that raised in the east conveyed to the west, or that this 
order should be reversed. Is that construction of the constitution to be 
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scope of commerce power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause therefore depends on the meaning of the power "to regu- 
late." 
The Supreme Court has most often defined the power to 
regulate as the power to "to prescribe the rule by which com- 
merce is to be governed."145 The Necessary and Proper Clause 
therefore grants Congress additional power to use means ap- 
propriate to attain the end of prescribing substantive commer- 
cial rules. I use the term "substantive" to refer to those rules 
which provide legal standards for the conduct of commerce or 
commercial actors. One type of means appropriate to this end 
is the establishment of officers, agencies, or courts to propose 
or adopt substantive rules. This would include the establish- 
ment of a forum to resolve commercial disputes by reference to 
express or implied federal policies. By selecting this type of 
means, Congress is essentially delegating its power to enact 
substantive commercial rules-to conform the conduct of com- 
mercial actors to federal policy of some nature. 
Another type of means appropriate to attain the end of 
prescribing substantive commercial rules is the enactment of 
rules adapted to make the substantive commercial rules effec- 
t i ~ e . ' ~ ~  This would include incidental power to regulate non- 
preferred which would render these operations difficult, hazardous, and 
expensive? 
Id. a t  406. The power to regulate commerce, at  least under the affecting-commerce 
rationale, is not a power to act directly, as in these cases, but to provide rules 
governing the actions of others. 
Although it is unclear whether McCulloch supports linking the powers granted 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to the meaning of the word "regulate," 
that is the most obvious construction of the constitutional text. 
145. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824) (emphasis added). 
The Court has consistently repeated this formulation in modern Commerce Clause 
cases. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 248-49 n.7 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(applying the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to state Game and 
Fish employees); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 276 (1977) (find- 
ing that federal shipping licensure preempted state fishing restrictions); National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (stating that regulations of wag- 
es are generally valid, but finding their application to state governments improper); 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964) (approving pro- 
hibition of racial discrimination in interstate commerce); North American Co. v. 
SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 704 (1946) (upholding validity of the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (uphold- 
ing the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938). 
146. The most obvious type of means are straightforward grants of enforcement 
power, although policymaking by necessity enters into enforcement decisions. 
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commercial activity related to commercial activity.147 In the 
absence of substantive commercial rules, however, there is no 
incidental power-there can be no appropriate means because 
they would not serve the constitutional end of making the com- 
mercial rules effective. Providing a federal forum alone would 
not therefore advance the "regulation" of commerce in the sense 
of providing rules for its conduct. Under the ALI's proposal, 
state law provides the standard of care to be exercised or the 
contract principles to  be considered when drafting commercial 
agreements. Federal resolution of the state issues does not 
affect the parties' legal duties outside of court. Thus, the re- 
moval power authorized by the ALI proposal is not within 
Congress's commerce power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
One argument against this interpretation of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause could be construed from the Supreme 
Court's approval of the Federal Arbitration The Act 
makes arbitration provisions of interstate commercial contracts 
enforceable but does not itself provide the rules which govern 
the arbitrators' decisions. In Southland Corp. v. Keating,"' 
however, the Court cited Marshall's language in Gibbons to 
show that the Act did provide a substantive rule of contract law 
to govern interstate commerce: namely, that a contractual arbi- 
tration provision is valid as a matter of federal substantive 
law. 150 
This interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
could also be challenged under the theory that Congress has 
power to refer all disputes involving interstate commerce to the 
federal courts.151 Unless, however, Congress provides the sub- 
stantive rule to be applied, or delegates the power to establish 
those rules to the courts, the federal forum would still not ren- 
der effective any rule governing commerce. Since the ALI pro- 
posal suggests neither substantive regulation of interstate 
commerce nor the development of substantive federal common 
147. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995). 
148. 9 U.S.C. $$ 1-14 (1994). 
149. 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984) (construing the Federal Arbitration Act as bind- 
ing on state courts as well as on federal courts). 
150. See id. 
151. This proposal is discussed in terms of "protective jurisdiction" in the con- 
text of federal question jurisdiction. See Epstein, supra note 20. Again, even if the 
Necessary and Proper Clause were construed to permit protective jurisdiction, the 
argument would have to undergo federal question scrutiny. See id. 
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law, the regulation of intrastate litigation is not authorized by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Since this interpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause depends on the meaning of the word "regulate," a differ- 
ent construction of that term would alter the conclusion. 
"Regulate" could be interpreted as the exercise of "control" over 
commerce. Under this interpretation, power to do whatever it 
takes to "control" commerce, whether by substantive rule or 
otherwise, would include power over anything that affects com- 
merce. This broad reading of "regulate" would justifj. an af- 
fecting-commerce rationale without a commercial limitation 
since any activity affecting commerce threatens Congress's 
control over it. The strongest support for this interpretation of 
"regulate" appears in the Second Employers' Liability Cas- 
e ~ . ' ~ ~  The Supreme Court there stated in bold terms that the 
power to regulate meant the power "to foster, protect, control 
and re~t ra in ." '~~ There, however, Congress had exercised con- 
trol by means of a substantive rule governing commerce itself: 
a rule defining railway companies' liability to their 
employees. '" 
Even the earliest argument for Congressional control over 
commerce, in Gibbons v. Ogden, was advanced in the context of 
substantive regulation. Daniel Webster, arguing for exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over interstate commerce, said, "Now, what 
is the import of this, but that Congress is to give the rule-to 
establish the system-to exercise the control over the subject? 
And can more than one power, in cases of this sort, give the 
rule, establish the system, or exercise the control?"'55 Even 
Webster, though, understood that this control would be exer- 
cised by rule, for he called it "this power of giving the general 
The Court responded to Webster7s argument as fol- 
lows: 
It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant, 
that, as the word "to regulate" implies in its nature, full pow- 
er over t h  thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the 
action of all others that would perform the same operation on 
the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire 
152. 223 US. 1 (1912). 
153. Id. at 47. 
154. Id. at 6-10. 
155. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1824) (emphasis added). 
156. Id. at 16. 
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result, applying to those parts which remain as they were, as 
well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform 
whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing 
what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as 
that on which it has operated. 
There is great force in this argument, and the Court is 
not satisfied that it has been refi~ted?~ 
The Court, however, did not rely on this expansive interpreta- 
tion of the power to regulate,158 and later clarified that the 
commerce power did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the 
federal government in all cases.15' Even had the Court held 
that Congress had exclusive jurisdiction, the "full control" lan- 
guage would need to be construed in light of the Court's defini- 
tion of the power to regulate: Congress may, by means of a rule 
governing commerce among the several states, exercise full con- 
trol over that commerce. 
The Court's later discussions of the power to control com- 
merce also involved substantive rules governing interstate 
commerce rather than rules enacted merely to exert an effect 
on commerce. The Daniel for instance, involved an ac- 
tual rule governing interstate commerce: a requirement that 
the owners, operators, or captains of a ship obtain a license 
fiom the United States.lG1 The Court's broad statement that 
the power to regulate commerce "authorizes all appropriate 
legislation for the protection or advancement of either inter- 
state or foreign commerce,"162 must therefore be understood 
in the case's substantive-rule context. Similarly, Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing co.,lG3 based the 
Federal Arbitration Act "upon . . . the incontestible federal 
foundations of control over interstate commerce and over admi- 
ralty."164 The case involved, however, control through a rule 
157. Id. at  209 (emphasis added). 
158. Id. a t  209-11 (relying instead on the Supremacy Clause to require the 
New York law to "yield to the law of Congress"). 
159. E-g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (demon- 
strating an early attempt to vest exclusive jurisdiction in some but not all com- 
merce cases); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (exemplifying a 
modern balancing approach to define the states' authority under the Commerce 
Clause). 
160. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). 
161. Id. at  564. 
162. Id. at  564. 
163. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
164. Id. at  405 (internal citations omitted). 
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actually governing interstate commerce. Likewise, North Amer- 
ican Co. v. SEC165 mentioned that the commerce power "'ex- 
tends to every part of interstate commerce, and to every instru- 
mentality or agency by which it is carried on; and the fill con- 
trol by Congress of the subjects committed to its regulation is 
not to be denied or thwarted by the commingling of interstate 
and intrastate  operation^.""^^ The case again involved an ac- 
tual rule governing interstate commerce. 16' 
Congress therefore has commerce power under the Neces- 
sary and Proper Clause to regulate activity, including noncom- 
mercial activity such as intrastate litigation, if its regulation 
facilitates the enforcement of federal substantive rules affecting 
the parties' commercial conduct outside of court. As applied, 
the Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress power 
to regulate intrastate litigation, since its regulation does not 
facilitate the enforcement of substantive rules. 
2. Jurisdictional element 
Still another route to regulation of noneconomic activity is 
to require the satisfaction of a jurisdictional element. A statute 
containing a jurisdictional element requires the government to 
prove in each proceeding specified facts showing authority over 
the persons or subject matter involved in the proceeding. 
Where an activity does not as a class come within Congress's 
constitutional authority, Congress can nevertheless regulate 
individual instances of that activity that do come within its 
power by including a jurisdictional element in the statute. The 
Court in Lopez noted that the statute there did not require 
such case-by-case proof that individual instances of the activity 
regulated had "an explicit connection with or effect on inter- 
state commerce.n168 
Satisfaction of a jurisdictional requirement would autho- 
rize removal for a narrow but important class of intrastate 
cases. For example, a corporation that is deemed to be a citizen 
of California might face products liability actions throughout 
165. 327 US. 686 (1946) (upholding validity of the Public Utility Holding Com- 
pany Act of 1935). 
166. Id. at 705 (quoting Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913)) (em- 
phasis added). 
167. Id. (involving a rule governing the registration and conduct of public utili- 
ty holding companies). 
168. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. 
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the nation. Assuming that the corporation could remove and 
transfer for consolidation to a single trial all its other cases, the 
Commerce Clause would not authorize removal of certain of the 
corporation's California cases-those originally filed in Califor- 
nia state courts by California citizens and governed by Califor- 
nia law. In these cases, however, a substantial effect on inter- 
state commerce could be found, thus satisfying the jurisdiction- 
al requirement. The actions would arise out of interstate com- 
merce, namely the sale of goods produced for both interstate 
and intrastate commerce by an interstate seller. The defendant 
could probably quantify its increased cost of defending individ- 
ual actions-costs which would economically effect interstate 
commerce. If the related cases were instead consolidated out- 
side of California, and the California cases remained in the 
state, the multistate defense would generate significant inter- 
state travel and commerce by witnesses, litigants, and lawyers. 
This subset of intrastate litigation would therefore have both a 
qualitative relationship to and a quantitative effect upon inter- 
state commerce. By imposing a jurisdictional element, Congress 
could thus reach this subset of cases without exerting power 
over all intrastate litigation, most of which has an effect on 
interstate commerce too attenuated to satisfy the requirement. 
3. Less attenuated arguments 
Even after Lopez, the government could frame an argu- 
ment for regulation of other subsets of noneconomic activities 
that in the aggregate have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce. The government's argument, however, would have 
to contain other self-contained limits to satisfy the requirement 
that congressional power over that subset of activities be con- 
sistent with the concept of enumerated powers. Although Lopez 
emphasized the absence of commercial activity, the Court's 
main criticism with the government's arguments was their 
limitless nature?' It is therefore possible that the commer- 
cial activity requirement applies only when the government's 
arguments have no other self-contained limits. Indeed, the 
decision in Lopez could be seen as applying only where the 
relationship to commerce is weak in similarity (because a non- 
169. See id. at 1632-34. 
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economic activity is inv~lved) , '~~ effect,'?' and proxim- 
ity. '" 
In the context of intrastate litigation, the government could 
argue that Congress has power to regulate the resolution of 
disputes arising out of commercial transactions even though 
Congress has not enacted substantive rules governing the 
transactions themselves. Although this limitation would differ 
from the commercial limitation, it might satis@ the Court that 
the commerce power is still subject to some "judicially enforce- 
able outer limits" on the Constitution's enumerated ~ 0 w e r s . l ~ ~  
Under this reasoning, Congress could regulate intrastate litiga- 
tion arising out of commercial transactions, but not all intra- 
state litigation. Because this reasoning allows federal courts to 
resolve disputes in the absence of substantive federal commer- 
cial rules,174 I find it unpersuasive for the reasons stated 
above. 
4. Congressional findings 
Finally, the Court may give Congress more leeway to regu- 
late noncommercial activities such as intrastate litigation if 
Congress makes strong, factually grounded findings connecting 
the activities with interstate commerce. In Lopez the Court 
noted that congressional findings help the Court in its "inde- 
pendent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce 
Cla~se ," '~~ yet concluded: "But to the extent that congres- 
sional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judg- 
ment that the activity in [Lopez] substantially affected inter- 
state commerce, even though no such substantial effect was 
visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here."lT6 The dis- 
senters were disturbed at the suggestion that findings could 
affect Congress's a~thority.'?~ Reading the opinions together, 
170. Id. at 1630-31 (classifying prior affecting-commerce decisions as involving 
"economic activities"); id. at 1632-34 (defending the Court's commercial limitation). 
171. Id. at 1633-34 (stating that the question is of size or degree). 
172. Id. at 1634 (concluding that the government's arguments would require 
the Court "to pile inference upon inference" and noting the absence of "any con- 
crete tie to interstate commerce"). 
173. Id. at 1633. 
174. See supra part IV.E.l (outlining a theory of commerce power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause). 
175. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (emphasis added). 
176. Id. at 1632 (emphasis added). 
177. See id. at 1655-57 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissent- 
ing). 
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it appears that findings would likely make a difference to a ma- 
jority of the Court only in cases involving activities with 
nonobvious effects on interstate commerce, effects which, once 
established, can be shown to be substantial. Even in these 
cases, however, the same showing would probably suffice if 
advanced by the government's lawyers at  trial and not by Con- 
gress in the legislation itself. Findings would therefore help the 
government only if Congress were better suited to proving sub- 
stantial effects than the government's lawyers. 
F. Relevance of Historical State Sovereignty 
Justice Souter also criticized the for its reference 
to "areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where 
States historically have been s~vereign."'~~ The Court made 
that reference to point out the limitless nature of the 
government's arguments, arguments that it felt would, if ac- 
cepted, give Congress "a general police power of the sort re- 
tained by the  state^."'^^ The Court's reference to state sover- 
eignty therefore appears directed a t  illustrating this 
limitlessness, not at arguing for an exception &om the com- 
merce power that Congress would otherwise have. At most, the 
Court's comment suggests that the majority might use histori- 
cal state sovereignty as an indication of whether a proposed 
application of the affecting-commerce rationale is consistent 
with the concept of enumerated powers. 
Justice Kennedy's opinion, on the other hand, reveals a 
much greater concern for state sovereignty. Congressional expe- 
ditions beyond commercial actors, conduct, or statutes should 
in his view "at least" provoke the Court to inquire "whether the 
exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an area of 
traditional state concern."181 Justice Kennedy's proposal may 
imply relaxed scrutiny in areas where the federal government 
was the first in the field, or perhaps heightened scrutiny where 
the states have historically exercised their power alone. If in- 
terference with areas of historic state concern were dispositive, 
the states' interest in enforcing their own laws between their 
own citizens would strongly oppose a removal power over intra- 
state litigation. Justice Souter's opinion aptly points out the 
178. Id. at 1654-55 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
179. Id. at 1632. 
180. Id. at 1632, 1634. 
181. Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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flaws in Justice Kennedy's approach. Further, Garcia held that 
the Fourth Amendment does not protect states from the reach 
of the Commerce Clause.lg2 Kennedy does not explain why 
the Commerce Clause limits its own reach to protect the states. 
Under the Supreme Court's reasoning, intrastate litigation 
as a class is probably beyond Congress's commerce power. Al- 
though the definition and application of Lopez's commercial 
limitation leave room for doubt, the likely resolution of those 
doubts points away from general federal removal power. Only 
in a discrete class of cases, in which a jurisdictional element 
has been satisfied, could removal be justified under the Com- 
merce Clause. Thus, the ALI's proposal to authorize removal of 
intrastate litigation cannot rest solely on Congress's commerce 
power. 
Kelly G. Black 
182. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
